Trade Shocks, Currency Unions and the Role of Fiscal Transfers
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A common trade shock can affect members of a currency union differently, while monetary policy cannot respond separately to country-specific conditions. This paper studies whether cross-country fiscal transfers can substitute for this missing adjustment margin. I develop a dynamic quantitative trade model with nominal rigidities and heterogeneous households and apply it to the 2025 U.S. tariff shock in the euro area. I introduce a cross-country fiscal transfer rule that operates as an automatic stabilizer, directing resources toward countries more adversely affected by the shock. Fiscal transfers of less than 1% of euro-area GDP in present value offset all the additional dispersion in terms of involuntary unemployment and consumption generated by the loss of country-specific monetary policy, while reducing a sizable part of the additional dispersion in employment and GDP. Thus, relatively small cross-country transfers can substitute for much of the stabilization role of country-specific monetary policy. Finally, I show that euro-area retaliation combined with fiscal transfers would have further mitigated the labor-market effects of the U.S. tariff shock.
Committee: Natalia Ramondo, Masao Fukui, Joaquin Blaum, and David Lagakos.